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PERSISTENT MISCONCEPTIONS: A RESPONSE
TO ROBERT HAMMEL
Janet Eriv*
The effects and application of handicap' civil rights laws.., are
not well understood, despite nearly unanimous support of their
overall purpose. Legal analysis and interpretation are not fully
developed, and there are popular misconceptions about their re-
quirements. As a result, many people harbor reservations, con-
cerns, and unanswered questions about civil rights provisions
that protect handicapped people: Do handicap antidiscrimina-
tion statutes only prohibit discrimination against handicapped
people, or have they been interpreted and applied to provide
extraordinary privileges to handicapped individuals not avail-
able to other citizens? Are handicapped people making unlim-
ited claims on public funds to remove anything that
inconveniences them?2
These words were published in 1983 by the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights. More than a decade has passed, during
which time a nationwide disability discrimination law, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 3 has been enacted,
and society as a whole has become much more aware of the barri-
ers facing people with disabilities. The legal analysis and interpre-
tation noted in the above quote were not fully developed in 1983,
and have been greatly expanded since. Yet Robert Hammel's arti-
cle4 reveals that the "popular misconceptions" referred to above
persist to a disturbing extent.
This essay responds to Mr. Hammel's article. In his conclusion,
Mr. Hammel opines that "'discrimination' means something differ-
* This essay is solely the work and opinion of the author in her private capacity
and it should not be construed under any circumstances to represent the official opin-
ion, policy or work product of the Mayor's Office for People with Disabilities.
1. The term "handicap" is no longer viewed as appropriate. Rather than referring
to "the handicapped" or "the disabled" the term "person with a disability" appropri-
ately places the emphasis on the person first and on the condition second.
2. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION
81, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 1 (1983) [hereinafter
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM].
3. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1994)).
4. Robert Hammel, Some Reflections on New York City's Disability Law, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1195 (1996).
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ent in disability cases from what it means in other areas of Human
Rights Law ... that courts must create substantive rights for the
disabled that are not available to other protected classes ... [and]
the disabled [one suspects] end up being awarded less relief than a
straightforward assessment of their needs would otherwise jus-
tify."'5 A second theme in his article posits that the New York City
Human Rights Law's expansive definition of "disability" dilutes
the protection that people with more serious disabilities deserve
"by rendering suspect common sense notions of 'merit' and by
making any assessment of ability potentially actionable."'6 The in-
tent of this essay is to show that the various notions that pervade
Mr. Hammel's underlying themes are examples of the kinds of pa-
ternalism and attitudinal barriers that disability rights laws were
adopted, in part, to counteract. Furthermore, as is explained be-
low, some of Mr. Hammel's conclusions are based upon unclear
analyses of other civil rights laws. In regard to the second theme, it
will be argued that the New York City Human Rights Law defini-
tion of disability does not inherently lead to the results Mr. Ham-
mel suggests. This essay provides a brief overview of civil rights
laws to demonstrate how disability discrimination law does fit into
traditional civil rights legal analysis. It then examines more specifi-
cally some key concepts in disability rights law, suggests how expe-
rience with federal disability discrimination law may be drawn
upon for the purposes of interpreting the relevant provisions in the
City Human Rights Law, and comments upon some specifics in Mr.
Hammel's article. Finally, this essay concludes with thoughts for
the future of the City's disability rights law.
The history of the civil rights movement in the United States has
been one of breaking down societal barriers to attain inclusion in
mainstream society; regrettably, Mr. Hammel appears to lose sight
of this. African-Americans and women were excluded from voting;
African-Americans were shut out of White-only schools; women
were deemed ineligible for many categories of jobs. The struggle
continually has been for access, a level playing field and a change
in mainstream attitudes. Then-Attorney General Richard Thorn-
burgh, testifying on behalf of any civil-rights legislation, stated that
"persons with disabilities are all too often not allowed to partici-
pate because of stereotypical notions held by others in society -
5. Id. at 1216.
6. Id.
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notions that have, in large measure, been created by ignorance and
maintained by fear."7
Civil-rights law identifies classes of individuals and prohibits the
denial of opportunities or services on the basis of one's member-
ship in a protected class. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as an example, states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.8
Courts have held that both intentional discrimination and neu-
tral policies that have the effect of discriminating are impermissi-
ble. Numerous "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" cases
demonstrate these principles.9 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the
seminal disparate impact case, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the Congressional intent behind Title VII in the follow-
ing way:
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees. Under
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices.' °
Thus, the goal of nondiscrimination provisions is to permit equal
opportunity on an individual basis, and to prohibit both the denial
of opportunity based upon stereotypes as well as adverse actions
7. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1989) (statement of Hon. Richard C. Thornburgh, Attor-
ney General of the United States).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
9. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
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based upon one's protected class status. Mr. Hammel criticizes dis-
ability laws as requiring substantive rights rather than equal treat-
ment," but this issue of providing a level playing field is not unique
to disability discrimination. In general, remedies have required
equal treatment; however, it is important to note that, in pre-ADA
civil rights law, some courts have held that identical treatment does
not result in true equality of opportunity. In order not to discrimi-
nate against (or to provide equal opportunity to) children whose
primary language is not English, for example, the Supreme Court
held that a school system was required under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to provide bilingual education. 12 The Court
stated that there was no equality of treatment by providing the
same books and facilities to all students irrespective of whether
they understand English. 13 To do so, the Court held, effectively
foreclosed the students from any meaningful education. 14
Pre-ADA civil rights laws also have required reasonable changes
in policies or procedures to accommodate certain protected class
members. In the area of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion,
reasonable accommodations for religious observances that would
not impose an undue hardship on an employer may be required. 15
Indeed the term "religion" is broadly defined as "all aspects of reli-
gious observance and practice.' 1 6 Determining whether a com-
plainant actually holds a religious belief or follows a religious
practice, and therefore is covered by the statute, is part of develop-
ing a case based on religious discrimination. 17 Where it is found
that an employee does follow religious practices, an employer may
have to change work schedules, or provide flexible work times, in
order to accommodate those practices. However, an employer
need not take action that would result in an undue hardship. Col-
lective bargaining agreements, as well as the impacts on other em-
ployees, are factors that may be considered.' 8
Another concept that courts have struggled with in the pre-ADA
civil rights arena is that of who is "qualified." Much attention has
11. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1214-15.
12. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1974).
13. Id. at 566.
14. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 99-100 (citing Lau, 414
U.S. 563).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
16. Id.
17. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970); United States v. See-
ger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
18. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-81 (1977).
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been paid to "bona fide occupational qualifications" (BFOQ) and
"business necessity." BFOQ is a narrow affirmative defense that is
available in religion, sex or national origin cases. Examples where
a BFOQ defense would be raised include the exclusion of females
from warehouse work because the job involves lifting 100 pounds
or the refusal to hire females as security guards in men's prisons.
The employer would need to demonstrate that all, or substantially
all, women cannot perform the job in question.19 In one case
where a job was deemed strenuous by an employer and therefore
not open to women, the Fifth Circuit looked to the specific duties
in question and to how frequently they were performed.20 Accord-
ingly, it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire individu-
als on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.21 A
separate but easily confused defense is that of "business necessity,"
applicable where work criteria exist that are apparently neutral but
exclude members of one sex at a rate higher than for the other. In
those cases, an employer would have to show why the criteria are
necessary to perform the job.22
Disability-rights laws do indeed build on the concepts that have
been developed in our legislative and judicial systems. The state-
ment that "one peculiarity of the disability model of discrimination
is that it requires the respondent to treat different protected classes
differently rather than treating them identically" 23 misses the dis-
tinction between identical treatment and equal opportunity. An
analysis of protected class status is found in religious discrimination
cases, thus belying the assertion that, "[t]he novelty of the disabil-
ity model of discrimination is compounded by the frequent conten-
tion of respondents in disability cases that the complainant should
not be properly recognized as disabled at all."' 24 A requirement of
reasonable accommodations, which is at the core of many disability
cases, also has an analogy in religious discrimination cases. Again,
Mr. Hammel's discussions on qualification and merit omit refer-
ences to applicable gender cases. While not all the legal analyses
from other kinds of civil rights cases can be applied automatically,
19. BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 358-59 (2d ed. 1983).
20. Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th
Cir. 1969).
21. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
22. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 359.
23. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1202.
24. Id. at 1202-03.
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they are instructive when looking at disability rights laws - includ-
ing the City's provisions.
The disability-rights movement developed separately from other
civil rights movements. Rehabilitation programs were established
when soldiers returned from World War I. Medical advances al-
lowed many more veterans to survive. Continuing medical ad-
vances in the twentieth century have dramatically increased the
numbers and lifespan of individuals with disabilities. In 1935, Pres-
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt established Social Security which in-
cluded the first program of permanent assistance to adults with
disabilities. World War II led to further expansion of rehabilitation
programs and, in 1948, discrimination on the basis of physical disa-
bility was prohibited in federal civil service employment. 5 The
Rehabilitation Act of 197326 was a broad federal funding bill for a
variety of services including medical care, independent living cen-
ters and vocational training. Just prior to its enactment, some civil
rights language, similar to provisions in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was added. A significant provision was Section 504, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment or
in the provision of services by entities receiving federal financial
assistance. Section 504's language tracks similar provisions in Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination on
the basis of race, color or national origin in federally assisted pro-
grams.27 Congress relied on its previous experience with civil
rights legislation when it enacted Section 504, and the section's ori-
gin probably was based on unsuccessful proposals to amend Titles
VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include disability
provisions.2 8 It took political protests similar to those in other civil
rights movements to finally force the signing in 1977 of Section 504
implementing regulations.2 9 In 1990, the ADA was signed into law,
expanding disability rights nationwide to prohibit discrimination by
certain public accommodations, government entities and employ-
ers regardless of funding sources. The ADA both incorporates and
25. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 21.
26. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended beginning at 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1994)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
28. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECrRUM, supra note 2, at 49-50 n.26.
29. The regulations, inter alia, prohibit employers from using any employment test
or other selection criterion that screens out or tends to screen out individuals with
disabilities unless the test or criterion is shown to be job related. This provision is
based on the Title VII concepts as set forth in Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. ACCOMMODAT-
ING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 152 n.61.
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builds upon Section 504, by including almost verbatim portions of
its detailed implementing regulations. This guidance should not be
ignored when interpreting our local law.
A few key concepts in disability law bear brief introduction.
While volumes have and could be written about them, the follow-
ing is provided as a brief review. On the federal level, the ADA
defines "disability" to mean a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
having such an impairment. 30 The City's Human Rights Law de-
fines that same term as any physical, medical, mental or psycholog-
ical impairment, and also provides protection to those who have a
history of or are regarded as having such impairments.31
Generally, an "accommodation" is any change in the work envi-
ronment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportuni-
ties.32 Only "reasonable accommodations" are required; unlimited
expenses need not be incurred, nor do actions need to be taken
that would enable an employee to reach his or her full potential, as
contended by Mr. Hammel. 33 An accommodation is not reason-
able if it imposes an "undue hardship" which, in general, means
significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity. No
set dollar amounts or formulas are provided, but the factors to be
considered are included in both the ADA's implementing regula-
tions and case law. Reasonable accommodations are required only
for a "qualified individual" to perform "essential job functions."
Essential functions are the fundamental job duties and not the
marginal ones.34 The inquiry into whether a job duty is essential is
not intended to second guess the employer nor to require him or
her to lower job performance standards.35 These approaches simi-
larly are applicable under New York City's Human Rights Law.
The Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA states that:
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
31. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.16 (1996).
32. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. app. pt. 1630 at § 1630.2(n) (1996) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance].
33. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1213 n.13.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1996); Haysman v. Food Lion, 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1101
(S.D. Ga. 1995).
35. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Interpretive Gui-
dance, supra note 32, at § 1630.2(n); U.S. EoUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE I TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL 1-2.39(a) (Jan. 1992).
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The ADA thus establishes a process in which the employer
must assess a disabled individual's ability to perform the essen-
tial functions of the specific job held or desired. While the ADA
focuses on eradicating barriers, the ADA does not relieve a dis-
abled employee or applicant from the obligation to perform the
essential functions of the job. To the contrary, the ADA is in-
tended to enable disabled persons to compete in the workplace
based on the same performance standards and requirements
that employers expect of persons who are not disabled.
However, where that individual's functional limitation im-
pedes such job performance, an employer must take steps to
reasonably accommodate, and thus help overcome the particu-
lar impediment, unless to do so would impose an undue
hardship.36
In a case concerning whether providing an aide to a disabled
teacher is a reasonable accommodation under Section 504, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the essential function
analysis as follows:
But is classroom management - the ability to maintain ap-
propriate behavior among the students - an essential function
of a tenured library teacher's job? We might intuitively think so.
But Section 504 does not permit us to rely on intuition - in-
deed, unthinking reliance on intuition about the methods by
which jobs are to be performed and how an individual's disabili-
ties relate to those methods is among the barriers that the Reha-
bilitation Act was designed to overcome. To avoid unfounded
reliance on uninformed assumptions, the identification of the es-
sential functions of a job requires a fact-specific inquiry into
both the employer's description of a job and how the job is actu-
ally performed in practice.37
As should be evident by now, these concepts of essential func-
tion and reasonable accommodation are not peculiar to disability
rights law. What makes disability cases more complex is that disa-
bility is often tied to functional limitations, so that disability dis-
crimination law cannot be completely neutral or indifferent to the
defining characteristic. The public policy of full participation re-
quires acknowledging and accommodating varying physical and
mental functional abilities. As in other areas of discrimination law,
there needs to be treatment which creates a level playing field -
not mindless application of simplistic remedies. There must be a
36. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 32, at Background.
37. Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted).
1226
1996] MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT DISABILITIES
careful parsing out of the essential functions, the legitimate qualifi-
cation standards, and the qualifications and abilities of the individ-
ual to perform those essential functions with or without reasonable
accommodations. 38
In the discussion of qualifications and merit, the appendix to the
ADA Title I regulations anticipates one of Mr. Hammel's examples
in which he suggests it would be impermissible to select the appli-
cant without a disability who types faster over an applicant with a
disability with a slower typing speed for a typist position:39
If an employer requires its typists to be able to accurately type
75 words per minute, it will not be called upon to explain why an
inaccurate work product, or a typing speed of 65 words per min-
ute, would not be adequate .... If an employer does require
accurate 75 word per minute typing.., it will have to show that
it actually imposes such requirements on its employees in fact,
and not simply on paper. It should also be noted that, if it is
alleged that the employer intentionally selected the particular
level of production to exclude individuals with disabilities, the
employer may have to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its selection.40
Reasonable accommodations are to be provided to "qualified"
individuals with disabilities. Mr. Hammel refers to merit as a re-
flection of one's abilities and achievements, not of one's protected
class. 1 Mr. Hammel appears to be in a quandary regarding how
merit applies to people with disabilities. The goal of disability
rights law is to focus on the "abilities" of a person with a disability
and not make presumptions about that person's limitations. Legiti-
mate questions should focus on abilities and qualifications and not
on impairments.42 The definition of disability or impairment
should not impact on the concept of merit. As Mr. Hammel points
out, an Administrative Law Judge deciding a case under the re-
vised City Human Rights Law concluded that unsuitability does
not necessarily mean disability.43
While the City Human Rights Law definition of disability is in-
tentionally broader than that of the ADA, it was not intended to be
38. Similarly, in terms of participating in programs, a qualified individual with a
disability may be entitled to reasonable modification of policies or practices.
39. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1206-07.
40. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 32, at § 1630.2(n).
41. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1203-04.
42. Cf id. at 1205-06.
43. Id. at 1207 (quoting Manitta v. New York City Police Dep't, Compl. No. E-93-
0679, Rec. Dec. and Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Aug. 2, 1994)).
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read in a vacuum; there is much material, case law and interpretive
guidance which can be instructive. In particular, the term "impair-
ment" is left undefined in the City Human Rights Law. Without
acknowledging it as such, Mr. Hammel himself cites a case which
contains a useful definition of the term "impairment" for City
Human Rights Law purposes:
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has observed in this context, '[i]t would debase [the] high pur-
pose [of fighting discrimination against the disabled] if the statu-
tory protections available to those truly handicapped could be
claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose rela-
tive severity of impairment was widely shared. Indeed, the very
concept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not
commonplace and that poses for the particular individual a
more general disadvantage in his or her search for satisfactory
employment.'"
In addition to questioning how qualification standards can be
maintained when applied to people with disabilities, Mr. Hammel's
repeated references to the needs of "the disabled" and the need to
provide benefits, indicates a lack of understanding of the distinc-
tion between providing a level playing field and conferring special
benefits. The Congressional findings in the ADA refer to the dis-
criminatory effects of architectural, transportation and communica-
tion barriers.45 Office buildings with stairs leading to the entrances
and buses without lifts are examples of barriers which will prevent
some individuals who use wheelchairs or other assistive devices
from having a job, because they cannot travel to work and enter
into the workplace. These barriers can make the difference be-
tween a person leading an independent life, contributing to society
and to the economy, or being dependent on governmental benefits
(Mr. Hammel's comment that the provision of such accessibility
features makes it less difficult for "the disabled" to participate in
the City's life greatly understates the situation). Providing equal
opportunity in the context of disability rights requires a recognition
of the existence of and then the removal of barriers - both attitudi-
nal and physical barriers.
Mr. Hammel's argument demonstrates further weakness when
he cites the provision of parking spaces, buses, bathrooms, curbs
and jobs accessible for people with disabilities, concluding that an
observer from Mars would assume "that the disabled enjoy . . . a
44. Id. at 1211 n.31 (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
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special status that allows them to claim a greater percentage of so-
ciety's resources than can their non-disabled counterparts. 46
Much remains inaccessible, and many people with disabilities are
excluded from a greater portion of facilities than "their nondis-
abled counterparts." Which is really the privileged class? Provid-
ing the accommodations of which Mr. Hammel complains is hardly
the same as providing "benefits" to people enjoying special status.
Rather, it is the partial removal of societal barriers to mainstream
participation that have served to isolate members of an historically
disfavored group. Viewing barrier removal properly - as action
necessary to provide meaningful opportunity - should reduce Mr.
Hammel's "confusion over whether the statute requires equal
treatment or special treatment .... "4 Before discriminatory barri-
ers will be removed on a widespread basis, there needs to be an
understanding that they exist.
Mr. Hammel's lack of understanding of the provision of equal
opportunity pales in comparison with this stereotypical extract:
It is often pointed out that people who are impaired in one way
often develop special abilities in other areas that are way above
average .... (deaf more visually adept than hearing people) ....
The [City] Human Rights Law ... does not explicitly address
whether or how one should take into account this phenomenon
of an impairment in one area producing a corresponding, com-
pensating talent in another.48
It would be equally absurd to ask whether Marlee Matlin's acting
talent developed because she is deaf, or because, as everyone
knows, all women have "special intuition." Likewise, one might
ask whether Stevie Wonder's special musical abilities exist because
he is blind, or because, as everyone knows, Blacks have "rhythm."
It is hard to respond to this notion that all people with disabilities
have compensating special talents. Civil rights laws certainly do
not take into account stereotypical forms of behavior associated
with various races and provide individual provisions for each
group. To the contrary, there is generally a rather broad definition
of the protected class, and the focus is on the behavior of the
respondent.
Therefore, when Mr. Hammel points out "what may be a distinc-
tively American peculiarity of the law governing the disabled;
namely, that it pursues its purpose of social reform not by directly
46. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1196-97.
47. Id. at 1198-99 n.7.
48. Id. at 1198 n.6.
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focusing on the needs of the disabled and on the benefits that
should be granted to fulfill these needs, but rather by attacking dis-
crimination, ' 49 he ignores the general framework of civil rights
laws. Social reform through the "attack" on discriminators is the
basis of our civil-rights law and is not peculiar to disability-rights
law. As the foregoing review of civil-rights law illustrates, the laws
prohibit covered entities from treating protected class members in
ways which deny them equality of opportunity, and where viola-
tions are found, there is enforcement including punishment of the
discriminator. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 restored the availabil-
ity of compensatory and punitive damages in certain cases involv-
ing intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, religion or
disability. "Legal tradition and history in the United States suggest
that the law can help mold people's conduct and eradicate pro-
scribed behavior." 50 "Punitive damages awards serve to deter cer-
tain conduct, as well as to punish."51
Furthermore, Mr. Hammel's focus on the "needs of the dis-
abled" reveals a paternalistic attitude. He does not give insight to
what help he feels "the disabled" need which would address their
needs more directly than the current disability discrimination
model, let alone who would be responsible for providing the bene-
fits or who would determine what benefits were needed.
Mr. Hammel's confusion between benefits and civil rights is evi-
dent again in the comparison with veterans benefits. 2 One needs
to parse out, in a way that Mr. Hammel does not, the different
bodies of law. Our legislation provides benefits, preferences, af-
firmative action, and nondiscrimination protection at varying levels
for different protected classes. Benefits in the form of vocational
training are provided to veterans with and without disabilities and
to individuals (non-veterans) with disabilities; rehabilitation serv-
ices are provided to veterans and other people with disabilities.5 3
These benefits were established in part for humanitarian reasons,
and in part for economic reasons. In enacting the ADA, Congress
found that the nation's proper goals regarding individuals with dis-
abilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, in-
49. Id. at 1199.
50. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 42.
51. Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 794 (6th Cir. 1995)
(Daughtry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 49, 54-55).
52. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1197-98.




dependent living, and economic self-sufficiency. Congress also
found that "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary dis-
crimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the op-
portunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those
opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. ' ' 54 Individuals
who are productive and working will add to society's resources,
rather than be dependent on public assistance. Preferences, such
as special consideration in appointments and promotions, are given
to veterans in large measure as recognition for the service they pro-
vided to the country and the corresponding time spent away from
the workforce. There are various forms of affirmative action. For
both veterans and qualified individuals with disabilities there are
provisions requiring federal contractors to "employ and advance in
employment" such individuals.56 Where there are violations, con-
tractors can be debarred, contrary to Mr. Hammel's contention
that the law respecting veterans "makes no particular attempt to
'punish' people who treat veterans 'badly."' 57 Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as part of its affirmative action provi-
sions, requires outreach and advertising of vacant positions in or-
der to increase the employment of qualified individuals with
disabilities. This kind of affirmative outreach is similar to that for
veterans, but distinguishable from Executive Order 11246 which
permits specific hiring goals based on race or gender. Then, there
are civil rights provisions, as discussed throughout this essay, in-
cluding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA and the New York City
Human Rights Law, all of which prohibit certain forms of behavior
which, either intentionally, or effectively, discriminate against pro-
tected class members. Mr. Hammel's general comments about
needs and benefits upon which he bases his conclusions that people
with disabilities are afforded unusual special status in society are
overly simplistic.
Furthermore, one needs to distinguish between hypothetical or
pending cases offered by Mr. Hammel and his conclusions about
what people with disabilities are entitled to under the City Human
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
55. 38 U.S.C. § 4214 (1996).
56. 38 U.S.C. § 4212.
57. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1197.
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Rights Law. The "Smith" case,5 8 in which a complainant is re-
questing a transfer to an accessible apartment in a housing complex
close to a particular hospital, raises some difficult questions regard-
ing competing tenant rights and the limits of reasonable accommo-
dation. There are gray areas in almost every law, and it is within
the adjudicatory purview to interpret legislative meaning. The
broad definition of the term disability in the City Human Rights
Law does not dictate that the complainant is entitled to any apart-
ment she requests. Once it is determined that she is within the
protected class, there should then be analysis of what reasonable
accommodation entails based on the particular set of facts.
Any new law invites testing in litigation. Recently the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's policy chief on the ADA
opined that the high number of charges under the ADA may be
due to the general definition of disability, but did not view this as a
weakness with the law. "'A by-product of the generic definition is
the frivolous lawsuits. But as long as the courts reject them, this is
not a problem .... What we see are by and large people who want
to work. That's what the ADA is all about."' 59 Congress, in pass-
ing the ADA, found that: (i) some 43,000,000 Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities; (ii) that this number is in-
creasing; and (iii) the failure to provide equal opportunity costs the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
from dependency and nonproductivity.6° A 1994 Louis Harris &
Associates poll reports that two thirds of individuals with disabili-
ties between the ages of 16 and 64 are unemployed, and that 79%
of those individuals want to work.
Clearly discrimination against people with disabilities persists
and, as exemplified by our essays, remains controversial. The City
Human Rights Law rightly includes nondiscrimination provisions
which cover people with disabilities. Interpretive guidance could
be adopted to further define "impairment." This is what is needed
and not some other form of "altruism" to "advance the interests of
the disabled. ' '61 Hopefully through education and experience, soci-
ety will continue to gain an understanding that the term "people
with disabilities" represents a widely varied group of individuals
with differing abilities who have a right to a level playing field.
58. Id. at 1212-16.
59. 15 BNAC COMMUNICATOR (BNA) at 14 (Winter 1996), quoting EEOC's
Peggy Mastroaianni.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
61. Hammel, supra note 4, at 1217.
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Identical treatment is not necessarily equal treatment, but removal
of existing barriers is simple nondiscrimination, as opposed to the
conferral of special treatment. Once the attitudinal barriers are re-
moved, it is much easier to have a discussion about eliminating
physical barriers and providing appropriate remedies for
discrimination.

